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ABSTRACT. In this paper we describe and analyse IP-based
spin-offs as a relatively new phenomenon for transferring
knowledge from science to industry. We argue that the effec-
tiveness of this mechanism is subject to a complex array of
institutional factors. These factors entail national, sectoral, re-
gional and managerial institutions. Based on an indicative
comparison between the Netherlands and the United States we
find that is especially the combination of national and sectoral
institutions that condition whether an IP-based spin-off is
established in the first place, whereas regional and managerial
institutions condition its subsequent chances of success. We
finish by formulating some notions for public policy.
Keywords: industry-science relationships (ISR), spin-offs, tech-
nology transfer, university patenting
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1. Introduction
One of the basic assumptions of publicly financed
research is that its results will be utilized and thus
contribute to social-economic welfare. It is widely
recognized that it does so. For the Netherlands it
has been established that about 21% of all tech-
nological innovations are based on such public
research (NOWT, 2000). However, there are still
various obstacles to be overcome before the results
of public research are actually utilized. This issue is
at the heart of current discussions, both within EU
and OECD member states, how results of public
research can best be commercialized (EC, 2001;
OECD, 2002; Ministry of Economic Affairs,
2004). A major question in this debate is how such
technology transfer can best be achieved.
Apparently, there are various possible types of
mechanisms for technology transfer, ranging from
licenses, contract research, mobility of scientists,
and technology roadmaps to publications of re-
search results in the public domain. This paper
focuses on one mechanism in particular, namely
IP-based spin-offs.
IP-based spin-offs have recently emerged as a
mechanism for technology transfer and build on
two relevant phenomena for an effective transfer
of technology, namely (1) IP protection at Public
Research Institutes (PROs),1 and (2) the estab-
lishment of spin-offs. The first phenomenon of IP
protection by PROs, such as taking out patents,
may lead to utilization of inventions that would
not have occurred without. The second phenom-
enon is the establishment of a new firm that is
dedicated to the development of an invention into
a new product or service. Such firms, usually re-
ferred to as spin-offs, focus on this generally risky
development process that is often ignored by
established firms. In addition, an intensive contact
between the spin-off and its ‘parent’ PRO, may
positively contribute to the successful development
of the invention and hence to a wider diffusion of
new technological knowledge. This paper focuses
on the combination of these two phenomena, i.e.
IP-based spin-offs from PROs.
Despite the recent interest for IP-based spin-
offs, an in-depth understanding of their effective-
ness as a mechanism for technology transfer is still
underdeveloped. This seems in line with the partial
view developed in most studies on technology
transfer (Bozeman, 2000). In these studies there is
a focus on one or a limited number of elements
while abstracting from other possibly relevant
factors (Jaffe, 2000; Jaffe and Lerner, 2001;
Mowery et al., 2001; Colyvas et al., 2002; Cohen
and Merrill, 2003; Di Gregorio and Shane, 2003;
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Nerkar and Shane, 2003; OECD, 2003; for an
overview see Link et al., 2003). The aim of this
paper therefore is to develop a more complete and
structured understanding of those factors that
determine the effectiveness of IP-based spin-offs as
a mechanism for technology transfer. More spe-
cifically, we aim to understand which institutional
factors create favorable conditions for establishing
them in the first place, as well as which factors
condition their subsequent chances of success.
This paper proceeds as follows. We first discuss
the phenomenon of IP-based spin-offs more in-
depth and present some basic empirical facts on the
Netherlands. This will be done in Section 2. In
Section 3, we present our conceptual framework
that helps us to understand the role of different
institutional factors in conditioning the effective-
ness of IP-based spin-offs. Furthermore, we discuss
our methods of data collection. Following the logic
of our conceptual framework, we then discuss and
analyse our empirical findings on IP-based spin-offs
in the Netherlands in the Sections 4–7. In Section 4,
we discuss the role of national institutions and in
Section 5 the role of sectoral institutions. In Section
6 we analyse the role of PROs, whereas in Section 7
we descend to the managerial level and discuss its
influence. Finally, in Section 8, we conclude and
discuss some notions for public policy. Although
our main focus in this paper will be on the Nether-
lands, we will also provide information and findings
on the US. The US can be considered as the
benchmark in the field of industry-science relations
(OECD, 2003), so that these US findings enable us
tomake some comparisons between both countries.
Such a comparison provides uswith an indication of
the relative performance of the Netherlands with
regard to IP-based spin-offs and enables us toobtain
insights in how to improve their effectiveness.
2. IP-based spin-offs in The Netherlands
In this section we provide a general introduction to
IP-based spin-offs, with a particular focus on the
Netherlands. As IP-based spin-offs of PROs
combine two phenomena, we make use of a defi-
nition that entails both these elements: (1) a new
firm which start-up includes a novel technological
knowledge that has recently been developed at a
PRO, and, (2) where this knowledge is protected
by an Intellectual Property Right (IPR) that is
either licensed or transferred to the firm. Note
that in this definition the direct involvement of
(ex-)staff in the management of the spin-off firm is
not necessarily required. By making this choice we
differentiate from other definitions of spin-offs
that stress such (ex-)staff involvement. This choice
is informed by experiences in the US, which indi-
cate that it is especially the category of firms with
no direct staff involvement in the management of
the organization, seems to have very promising
prospects. Following this definition, we discuss in
this section the various characteristics of this type
of spin-off and its potential strengths, both from a
PRO perspective and from a public policy per-
spective. Moreover, we present some basic empir-
ical facts on IP-based spin-offs that have been
established in the Netherlands.
Potential strengths of IP-based spin-offs: a PRO
perspective
In the Netherlands we observe a clear trend of
PROs that protect their inventions increasingly by
making use of IPRs such as applying for patents,
exercising copyrights and other forms.2 For in-
stance, the average number of annual patent
applications by Dutch universities has grown from
four in 1981 to about 80 in 1998, while patenting at
other PROs is also observed to be growing at a
steady pace (Ministry of Economic Affairs, 2001).
One reason for PROs to make use of IP protection
is of particular relevance in the context of this
paper: it facilitates the utilization of public-foun-
ded research results by firms, especially when
substantial additional research is required in view
of commercial application. Especially in this case,
firms will only consider further development and
engage in the associated investments if they have
possibilities for protection against copying.
Other reasons for PROs to stimulate IP-based
spin-offs is that they enable to retain and recruit
staff, to induce closer ties with industry and to
promote economic growth. These arguments in
favor of IP-based spin-offs should be weighed
against their potential disadvantages. A potential
disadvantage is that it may have a negative
effect on publication efforts by PRO staff. Other
negative effects are that it may create a threshold,
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financial or otherwise, for firms to utilise research
results. Moreover, it may create a monopoly in the
hands of a single firm, especially in the case of an
exclusive license. Finally, applying for and owning
IPRs implies a costly and time-consuming process.
Apart from these IP related aspects, for PROs,
the most important argument for spin-offs is to
improve the effective transfer of technology. At-
tempts in the late 1980s to promote the commer-
cial use of novel technological knowledge revealed
that the process of technology transfer could be
greatly facilitated, when not only the codified
knowledge was exchanged but also the associated
tacit knowledge, ideas and ‘creative energy’ of the
involved researchers (Wintjes et al., 2002). This
can best be achieved by an involvement of
the PRO researchers in the further technological
development and commercialization, in other
words, through a spin-off. In addition, PROs per-
ceive more advantages associated with spin-offs.
Table I provides an overview.
Potential strengths of IP-based spin-offs: a public
policy perspective
Policy makers are generally interested in the
development of spin-offs from PROS as they are
considered to bring along economic growth and
create new jobs. Recent data show, for instance,
that no less than 44% of all the life science firms
founded in The Netherlands between 1990 and
2002 are spin-offs (Biopartner, 2002). In compar-
ison with corporate spin-offs, however, PRO
spin-offs grow considerably slower, a finding that
may be explained by the fact that they tend to
operate in new areas of highly complex and more
radical technologies (see Claryse et al., 2001). In
this respect, PRO spin-offs may be of substantial
importance to creating and establishing more
radical technological breakthroughs and innova-
tions. Other reasons why policy makers are
interested in PRO spin-offs are that they may
create new fields of entrepreneurial activity in the
proximity of a PRO. This, in turn, may contribute
to innovativeness, economic vitality and compet-
itiveness of the particular region. So, in fulfilling
an intermediary role between PROs and busi-
nesses, they may contribute to economic renewal
and improve regional employment and develop-
ment.
Another relevant issue here is that IP-based
spin-offs may help in keeping promising entrepre-
neurs ‘at home’, who might else go abroad when
being too much constrained in their ambitions. In
addition, over time spin-offs may become export-
ers of knowledge, products and services. A final
issue here is that (tacit) expertise held by employ-
ees of such firms, may diffuse more widely once
these people leave and join other organizations. A
well-documented example is that of Fairchild
Semiconductors, a Silicon Valley-based spin-off
firm that has been a breeding place for many other,
very successful firms in that area (see Rothwell,
1983). On the downside, a potential risk of
(over)stimulating IP-based spin-offs is that it may
negatively affect the focus on knowledge creation
Table I
Perceived reasons to promote PRO spin-off projects
Contribute to
regional development
Jobs (Creation of employment, particularly high tech jobs; Keep graduates in region)
Better industrial structure (New types of industry; Development of knowledge based companies; New




Stimulate collaboration between PROs and industry
Get closer to industry and market
Structured approach to enterprise development
Possibility of clustering, make a focus
Better performance
towards students
Education (Helps to develop student curriculum; Getting a better education; Pro-active programme)
Professional perspective (Reduce graduate unemployment; Counterpart for multinationals)
Improve PRO culture
and image
Culture (Alternative career option researchers; Make profit from research; Industrial research labs ‘realise
innovation’)
Image (Makes institutes more acceptable political and social; Attract better students/staff; Increase quality
of institute; Gaining funds for better research)
Source: UNISPIN (1999), reprinted in Van der Sijde and van Tilburg (2000).
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at PROs, by systematically undervaluing funda-
mental research in comparison with applied
research.
Some empirical facts on the Netherlands and the US
When comparing available data on both IPRs and
spin-offs for the Netherlands and for the US, we
can observe one clear trend (see also Table II): all
figures are higher for the US, not only in absolute
sense but also in relative sense. The most striking
difference is that of licensing income per PRO,
which is tenfold higher: on average, university
TTOs in the US annually generate 7.7 million
Euro, whereas their Dutch counterparts on aver-
age receive 0.8 million Euro. For other figures,
such as the number of licenses per PRO and the
number of spin-offs, the differences are closer to a
factor of two. As a general conclusion we can say
that PROs in the Netherlands have less experience
in patenting and stimulating spin-offs than their
US counterparts. And most certainly, they are far
less experienced than the US front-runners. For
this reason, we expect that the Netherlands will to
be able to learn a lot from US experiences.
3. Conceptual framework and methods of data
collection
Now that we have defined and described IP-based
spin-offs in more general terms, we will further
consider the main topic of this paper, namely the
role of different institutional factors in condi-
tioning the effectiveness of IP-based spin-offs as a
mechanism for technology transfer. At first
glance, and when reviewing the literature, we can
think of a wide array of institutional factors that
may influence their effectiveness. For example, as
mentioned in the literature, PRO policy regarding
technology transfer is considered to play an
important role (Argyres and Liebeskind, 1998).
This role affects whether a PRO will make use of
IPRs, whether spin-offs are established and in
how far they are supported (Di Gregorio and
Shane, 2003; Markman, et al., 2004; Kenney and
Goe, 2004). This policy, in turn, is strongly
embedded in a national institutional environment
(Graham and Mowery, 2003; OECD, 2003), as
well as in a sectoral environment (Nerkar and
Shane, 2003). In other words, national laws and
policy as well as sectoral factors may influence the
effectiveness of IP-based spin-offs (Jaffe, 2000;
Cohen and Merrill, 2003; OECD, 2003). In
addition, firm internal factors may play a sub-
stantial role as well (Wintjes, 2002; Casper and
Whitley, 2004). In fact, over the past decade the
literature has expanded greatly and has pointed to
the role of different kinds of factors.
In order to better understand the role and rel-
evance of this variety of factors, and how they
interrelate, we propose two steps. A first step en-
tails to distinguish factors that mostly affect the
potential to establish an IP-based spin-off, and
once established, from those factors that mostly
affect its subsequent chances of success. As we will
show in the following sections, these are two
different issues and should therefore be kept
analytically separate. A second step is to make
use of a conceptual framework, developed in
earlier research, which differentiates among
four institutional layers of a national system of
Table II
Data on patenting and spin-offs in the US and in The Netherlands in the year 2000 or 2001
Netherlands US
Total number of patents granted, nationwide 64 (universities) 3617 (universities)
103 (other PROs) 1486 (other PROs)
Average number of licenses negotiated per TTO 14.7 (same for universities and other PROs) 24.1 (universities only)
Average income from IP per TTO 0.76 million Euro (all PROs) 7.7 million Euro (universities only)
Average number of spin-offs 1.07 (universities) 2.0 (universities)
0.67 (other PROs)
Source: OECD (2003). Data from the Netherlands based on a sample including 23 Dutch universities and 13 other PROs. Data on the
US includes 168 US universities and 10 other PROs. What are referred to as start-ups in the OECD study fall under the definition of
spin-offs in this paper.
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innovation (Van der Steen, 1999, 2003). These
various institutional layers of a national innova-
tion system form the selection environment PROs
and IP-based spin-offs (Nelson, 2001). The basic
idea of the model is that these different institu-
tional layers are structured in a hierarchical order
that brings the benefit of being able to systemati-
cally rearrange and analyze the different institu-
tional factors that influence the creation and
success of IP-based spin-offs. Figure 1 demon-
strates that the conceptual model consists of four
relevant institutional layers that each has an effect
on the potential to establish an IP-based spin-off
and/or on its subsequent success chances. In the
following sections we discuss each layer in more
detail.
Following this framework we propose to dis-
tinguish between four institutional layers. The first
institutional layer refers to the national economy.
The second layer consists of institutions at the
sectoral level, including sectoral differences in
knowledge transfer and appropriation strategies
and patenting behavior. The third level comprises
university policies concerning IP-based spin-offs,
including university patenting policy and technol-
ogy transfer strategy, arrangements and activities.
The fourth level is the micro-level, focusing on the
management of the IP-based spin-off.
Methods of data collection
Following the logic of this framework we have
combined three data collection methods. First, we
have analyzed the available literature. The second
method entailed a survey on university patenting
in the Netherlands (Arundel et al., 2003). This
survey, co-leaded by the authors of this article, was
conducted as part of an OECD study group of 15
countries on university patenting and university
spin-offs. Thirdly, we have conducted a number of
interviews. With regard to universities we have
interviewed eight research universities, four of
which were based in The Netherlands and four in
the United States. At the universities we have
interviewed the managing director of the Tech-
nology Transfer Office (TTO), faculty members
and research directors. In addition, we have ana-
lyzed the vision and policy of the university board
based on annual reports and formal policy docu-
ments. With regard to firms we have interviewed
six spin-off firms, four of which were based in the
Netherlands and two in the US. These firms were
established in the life sciences (including biotech-
nology, pharmaceuticals, medical technology and
agro-food) and information- and telecommunica-
tions technology (ICT) sectors. For the interested
reader, we have added four selected cases as an
appendix.
4. First layer: national law and policy
The first institutional layer in our conceptual
model (see Figure 1) discusses national law and
policy. In this section we discuss two key charac-
teristics of this layer: national patent law and
Layer 1: National law and policy
(Section 4)
Layer 2: Sectoral characteristics
(Section 5)
Layer 4: Management of the spin-
off (Section 7)






Figure 1. Conceptual model of different institutional layers that affect the establishment and chances of success of IP-based spin-offs
(adopted from van der Steen, 1999).
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policy and national spin-off policy. As we will
argue, these two elements mostly influence the
potential to establish IP-based spin-offs.
Establishing spin-offs: patent law and policy
In order to structure our insights on the role of
patent law and policy in establishing IP-based
spin-offs, we distinguish between the more general
impact of the national system of laws including the
‘Grace Period’ and the more specific impact of
the Bayh-Dole Act. Compared to the Netherlands,
the US system of patent laws is in principle more
beneficial for PRO patenting and the potential to
establish IP-based spin-offs. This has two reasons.
First, the US system favors in principle the right of
patent owners (Merges, 1997; Lanjouw and Lern-
er, 2001).3 As a logical consequence, a US PRO
that wants to patent its invention and commer-
cialize it in the form of an IP-based spin-off, has
legally a stronger position than a PRO in the
Netherlands. This increases the chance that an
IP-based spin-off will be established.
Second, the US patent law applies to a broader
set of patentable inventions (Cohen and Merrill,
2003; Ziedonis, 2003). As a logical consequence, a
larger domain of PRO inventions is receptive for
patent application and in principle to be com-
mercialized in the form of an IP-based spin-off. In
fact, the US legal extension of patentable inven-
tions of the recent years concerned in particular
new technological fields such as research tools,
life forms and genetic inventions in biotechnol-
ogy. It is precisely in these technological fields
that PROs have a strong patent position and tend
to establish IP-based spin-offs (Jaffe, 2000;
Mowery et al., 2001; Wintjes et al., 2002; OECD,
2003). This combination of reasons creates a
higher potential number of inventions to patent
and increases possibilities to establish IP-based
spin-offs in the United States, when compared to
the Netherlands.
Moreover, the US have another element in their
patent laws that has a more specific impact on
patenting behaviour of PROs and the potential to
establish IP-based spin-offs, known as the ‘Grace
Period’. The Grace Period allows a limited period
after publication of an invention, for instance in a
scientific journal, during which a patent can still be
applied for. This limited period of respite has in
principle a positive impact on the creation of
IP-based spin-offs because it enables small-scale
inventors and researchers who are usually the ones
involved with spin-off creation. This brings two
important benefits. First, it allows individual
researchers to publish without blocking the road
to patent application. Herewith, the Grace Period
overcomes a potential conflict of interests between
on the one hand, the researcher’s obligations and
interests to publish his/her scientific invention in
journals and present at conferences and, on the
other hand, the commercialization of the invention
and the establishment of a IP-based spin-off
(Nelson, 2001). A second benefit is that the Grace
Period allows universities or IP-based spin-offs to
obtain support or seek publicity for their innova-
tion before they decide to submit an application.
As a consequence, the Grace Period diminishes the
risks involved with patenting and licensing. In
contrast, the Netherlands do not have a Grace
Period. Recent discussions at the EU-level to
establish a Grace Period led to the conclusion that,
from a legal perspective, the European ‘first-to-file’
system conflicts with a Grace Period type of
arrangement (Galama, 2000; EC, 2002), so that it
should not be installed.
The Bayh-Dole Act
The Bayh-Dole Act (1980) has in particular
encouraged non-profit research organizations and
small businesses to patent inventions. The Bayh-
Dole Act has helped to create incentives for
research organizations that perform government-
funded research to protect, manage and exploit
intellectual property and create IP-based spin-offs
(Henderson et al., 1998). The specific elements of
the Bayh-Dole Act, specific in comparison with the
institutional arrangements in the Netherlands, will
be further discussed below. The Bayh-Dole Act
(1980), in particular the ‘35 United States Code’
(USC) 202 of the Act, encourages non-profit
research organizations and small businesses to
acquire title to inventions developed with public
support. Herewith the Bayh-Dole Act provided for
institutional ownership for PROs and IP-based
spin-offs. In addition, universities may not assign
their ownership of inventions to third parties, ex-
cept to the Technology Transfer office (TTO). This
entails an obligation of the PRO to be engaged in
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the management of their intellectual property and
in spin-off creation.
In the Netherlands, the Dutch Patent Act grants
in principle research universities title for owner-
ship unless agreed otherwise by contract. Al-
though PROs that perform government-funded
research are allowed to patent and license inven-
tions, PROs are independent in deciding on their
own specific patent and license ownership policy.
Therefore, patent and license practice varies
greatly from institute to institute in the Nether-
lands (Arundel et al., 2003).
In the US, disclosure and exploitation of the
university patent are essential since the Bayh-Dole
Act. According to the Act, the PRO is obliged to
have written agreements with its faculty and
technical staff requiring disclosure and assignment
of inventions.4 At many US universities this obli-
gation to disclose information has resulted in a
more active Technology Transfer Office including
a more active stance towards spin-off creation
(Nelson, 2001; OECD, 2003). In contrast with the
United States, PROs and university researchers in
the Netherlands have no legal or regulatory obli-
gation to disclose and exploit intellectual property.
There is no legal or funding requirement from the
national government for PROs to report to the
funding agencies or rules for disclosure of inven-
tions or IP activity of researchers to their research
institute. Sometimes it is arranged for in specific
university regulations (OECD, 2003). Therefore,
the chance that PROs have a more active stance
towards the establishment of IP-based spin-offs
will be higher in the US than in the Netherlands.
The Bayh-Dole Act provides for royalty sharing
from patents and licenses as an incentive to
encourage researchers and PROs to disclose and
exploit inventions. To stimulate disclosure of
inventions by researchers, PROs and inventor(s)
share revenues received from licensing the inven-
tion. According to Nelson (2001), and confirmed
by our own interviews, the incomes of university
researchers and the funding of their labs have be-
come more sensitive to royalty income and here-
with form an incentive to IP-based spin-off
creation; some faculty professors earn a good in-
come by holding stock in IP-based spin-offs that
draw on their inventions and knowledge. In con-
trast with the US, in the Netherlands there are no
national laws or institutional guidelines for
allocating royalties from patents or licenses. Here,
rules of royalty sharing depend on the individual
PRO patent policy. Sometimes, these policies do
not exist and herewith this financial incentive to
establish spin-offs is not as common as in the
United States (Arundel and Bordoy, 2002).
The Bayh-Dole Act stipulates that in licensing
practice, the PRO must give preference to small
business firms. i.e. fewer than 500 employees (there
is a provision, however, that these firms must have
the resources and capability for bringing the
invention to practical application.). The current
US pro-small business stance follows from the fact
that US PROs create by far the largest number of
spin-offs (OECD, 2003).
A key characteristic of the research landscape in
the Netherlands is that the industry–science rela-
tions are often less formal and the ownership of
intellectual property of industry–science research
is not regulated by law (OECD, 2003). Therefore,
scientific inventions of privately sponsored re-
search are often shared between the firm and the
PRO. In many cases it is unclear however, whether
this reflects actual joint ownership of a patented
invention or a contract that requires the research
university to license a patent on an exclusive basis
to the sponsoring firm (Arundel and Bordoy,
2002). Clearly, in the Dutch industry–science
environment there is a stronger incentive to
transfer (ownership) of patent rights to larger
business firms than to create an IP-based spin-off.
Establishing spin-offs: national spin-off policy
Formally, the US do not have a federal spin-off
policy. However, Etzkowitz (2003, p. 48) uses the
term ‘Public Venture Capital’, to include a sub-
stantive set of various government programs both
at the federal and local level that provide funds to
innovative spin-off firms to help them realize eco-
nomic gains from scientific and technological ad-
vances. In the 1990s, the Office of Science and
Technology (OSTP) has formulated technology
transfer and research cooperation, particularly
involving small and medium sized companies, as a
‘critical building block’ of technology policy
(Bromley, 2004). So, in practice the federal gov-
ernment supports a strong spin-off policy, based
on the conviction that they stimulate economic
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growth. Moreover, technology transfer is listed
prominently on the agenda of the different states.
The state government programs to assist innova-
tive spin-offs are substantive, according to Etzko-
witz (2003) up to 3.5 billion US dollars. The
underlying idea here is that universities are
important drivers for economic development and
that applied research should be strongly stimu-
lated. Usually, it concerns economic development
within the state borders. Many state programs
offer different forms of entrepreneurial assistance,
including small grants to develop projects that can
become eligible for larger federal grants. State
programs also support entrepreneurs to overcome
funding gaps in federal programs. The programs
may also include tax reductions schemes, financial
incentives to stimulate cooperation between uni-
versities and companies. Sometimes state govern-
ments and municipalities provide in different ways
for the right service infrastructure and entrepre-
neurial climate for spin-offs, for instance in the
form of incubators and technical assistance. An
example of an active state policy can be found in
the State of Utah (see for instance Utah Tech-
nology Alliance, 2001).
In the Netherlands, spin-off policy is part of the
innovation policy of the Ministry of Economic
Affairs. Since the 1990s several subsidy schemes
exist,5 however, it is only since recently that the
new innovative spin-off firms are considered as top
priority for economic development (Ministry of
Economic Affairs, 2003a). In this respect, the
Netherlands try to stimulate spin-off creation by
creating a ‘breeding’ place for IP-based spin-offs
through pre-seed facilities, incubator parks and
improving the entrepreneurial culture. These
measures should tackle three major barriers to
spin-off creation: the absence of risk capital (spe-
cifically early stage funding), a weak entrepre-
neurial culture, and a lack of entrepreneurial skills
(Ministry of Economic Affairs, 2003b).
In conclusion
With regard to the role of national laws and pol-
icy, as the first institutional layer in Figure 1, we
can conclude that the US system of patent laws
and policy (including the Grace Period) favors
PRO patenting and the potential to establish IP-
based spin-offs, compared to The Netherlands. In
addition, the Bayh-Dole Act has provided a clear
incentive for university patenting and has
increased the potential for creating IP-based spin-
offs in the US. In particular, its mandatory
disclosure and reporting, its rules for royalty
sharing and its focus on small businesses. More-
over, spin-offs are much more prominently on the
US agenda than in the Netherlands. As a conse-
quence, the US government spends a much larger
budget, also relatively speaking, to support spin-
off creation and has more experience with spin-off
policy. This positive governmental stance towards
spin-offs may provide an additional incentive for
PROs in the US to establish IP-based spin-offs.
5. Second layer: sectoral characteristics
The role of national institutions notwithstanding,
new knowledge creation and its effective transfer
are also importantly shaped by sectoral institu-
tions (Pavitt, 1984; Malerba and Breschi, 1997).
This section discusses the role of such sectoral
institutions, the second layer in our conceptual
model. In developing our understanding of the
role of this sectoral layer, we first discuss the role
of the sectoral knowledge base that conditions the
extent in which it is attractive to establish an IP-
based spin-off. Once established, our findings
indicate that it is the presence of regional clusters
that shape the subsequent chances of success.
Establishing spin-offs: the role of the sectoral
knowledge base
Empirical evidence on the importance of sectoral
institutions can be found in for instance Arora
et al. (2002). These empirical studies indicate that
there exist strong sectoral differences in knowledge
transfer, appropriation strategy and IPR behav-
iour. Especially in knowledge intensive industries,
the most determining factor of such sectoral dif-
ferences is formed by the characteristics of the
sectoral knowledge base (Malerba and Breschi,
1997; Coriat and Weinstein, 2003). The specific
properties of the sectoral knowledge base have a
profound effect on knowledge creation, its diffu-
sion, possibilities for protection, and hence for the
potential to establish IP-based spin-offs. It is
especially in the case of a specialized, monodisci-
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plinary knowledge base in combination with cod-
ified and tacit knowledge as key-outcomes of the
search process, that IP-based spin-offs form an
attractive vehicle for transferring such knowledge.
Let us further clarify.
Monodisciplinary knowledge makes that an
innovation relies on an in-depth understanding of a
(relatively) narrow field of expertise (Teece, 1986).
In this case, the source of innovation typically lies
within such firms, which creates the need to protect
against spill-overs and imitation. As argued, this
may not be so difficult when knowledge is tacit with
its limited potential for spill-overs and absorption
by others. However, in the case of science-based
knowledge, as developed at universities and PROs,
knowledge is highly codified and the occurrence of
spill-over may increase, as codified knowledge dif-
fuses more easily and more widely (Nooteboom,
2000). In this case, the use of IPR becomes an
effective mean to protect against spill-overs. Under
these conditions of properties of sectoral knowl-
edge, not surprisingly, firms are not inclined to-
wards rapid disclosure. Proprietary knowledge can
only be disclosed after being assigned a patent. At
the same time, knowledge with regard to the search
process itself remains highly tacit, being embodied
in people and research teams. So, under these
conditions IP-based spin-offs form an attractive
vehicle for technology transfer of both the codified
and tacit elements of the knowledge base. This
combination of codified and tacit knowledge is an
important point. If it is only the codified knowledge
that needs to be transferred, licences form a more
efficient alternative. If it is mainly tacit knowledge
that needs to be transferred, more efficient means
of technology transfer are formed by mobility of
researchers, co-location of research facilities of
firms and PROs, ‘centres of excellence’ and so on.
Such mechanisms enable a close interaction be-
tween the involved people, which is very important
for the transfer of tacit knowledge (Malerba and
Breschi, 1997; Nooteboom, 2000). So, IP-based
spin-offs can best be used in sectors in which pre-
dominantly monodisciplinary knowledge is devel-
oped, containing codified and tacit elements that
both need to be transferred in view of commercial
application.
Given this, it is interesting to see that IP-based
spin-offs form one of the key-vehicles for tech-
nology transfer in the biotechnology industry
(McKelvey and Orsenigo, 2004; Pisano, 2002;
Gilsing and Nooteboom, 2006). In this industry,
new technological knowledge is firmly rooted in a
specific kind of scientific discipline such as molec-
ular biology, genomics, combinatorial chemistry
or others, entailing important codified and tacit
elements (Enzing et al., 2003). Given its strong
scientific content, this knowledge is of a more
mono-disciplinary nature and generally highly
codified through academic publications. In addi-
tion, an important element of the search process is
tacit and consists up of skills and routines
regarding the process of scientific research itself.
These tacit elements are also critical to transfer
given the importance for constantly searching for
new technological knowledge in the biotechnology
industry, and to build up sufficient absorptive
capacity (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990).
In contrast are our findings on the ICT-sector.
Despite much of the recent attention for software
patents, none of the interviewed PROs expected
that IPRs would have relevance to them on the
short to medium term. These findings were con-
firmed by the spin-offs that we have interviewed in
the ICT-sector. Also these firms were convinced
that software patents would have limited value to
them. The explanation for this may rest in the
more multidisciplinary and predominantly tacit
knowledge base of ICT. Moreover, in this sector
new technological knowledge does generally not,
when in an explorative phase, require an immedi-
ate protection through patents. In general, soft-
ware patents are more relevant for commercial
software that is closer to commercialization (Cor-
iat and Weinstein, 2003). As a consequence, non-
IPR types of protection were found to play a much
larger role, such as secrecy and lead-time.
In sum, we see that the properties of the sectoral
knowledge base play a role in the potential to
establish IP-based spin-offs. This mechanism for
knowledge transfer is best to be used in sectors in
which predominantly monodisciplinary knowledge
is developed, containing codified and tacit ele-
ments that both need to be transferred in view of
commercial application.
Chances of success: the role of regional clusters
In line with the fact that many PROs perceive
regional aspects as relevant (see also Section 6), we
553Effectiveness of IP-based Spin-offs
will further discuss the importance of regional
clusters. In the literature on clusters, it has been
often indicated that regional factors such as the
availability of state-of-the-art knowledge, experi-
ence, capital, talent and housing support the
development of regional clusters. Such clusters are
formed by geographical concentrations of inter-
related enterprises and institutes, and may show a
good performance in terms of productivity and
innovation (Porter, 1990, 1998). In this respect,
such dynamic, regional clusters may provide a
good breeding place for start-ups and for IP-based
spin-offs in particular (Jaffe et al., 1993; Mansfield
and Lee, 1996; Mowery and Ziedonis, 2001).
Proximity and regional embeddeness in a network
of public and private collaborations is an impor-
tant factor for IP-based spin-offs in biotechnology
(Audretsch and Stephan, 1996; Oliver, 2004,
Zucker et al., 1998).
All our interviewees greatly underlined the role
of clusters, and in particular the importance of
geographical proximity. Especially during the first
phase of the spin-off, housing at the institute or
within distance of only a few miles, is considered
to be very important. This is confirmed by data
from the Association of University Technology
Managers, reporting that 79% of the 364 univer-
sity spin-offs in 1998 were founded in the state in
which the licensing institution is located (AUTM,
1998). So, geographical proximity in the relation
between clusters and IP-based spin-offs is crucial
and seems to work two ways. On the one hand, the
presence of a knowledge-generating engine like a
PRO often forms an essential part of a cluster. In
this context, IP-based spin-offs are of particular
value as they can play a pivotal role in transferring
knowledge developed at public research organiza-
tions to firms in the cluster that can further
capitalise upon it. On the other hand, IP-based
spin-offs also benefit largely from geographical
closeness within the cluster. The exchange of tacit
knowledge with the PRO as much as with firms,
informal contacts with former colleagues, possi-
bilities to use laboratory equipment and options to
attract new talent, all benefit from geographical
proximity (Dahl and Pedersen, 2003).
Our interviewees indicated that another impor-
tant cluster factor is formed by the availability of
start-up capital. This is in line with recent litera-
ture claiming that university funding and/or (pre)
seed capital is a prerequisite to overcome the
period between the establishment of the firm and
its first large capital investments (Matkin, 2001).
Moreover, Di Gregorio and Shane (2003) mention
the importance of the university willingness to
make equity investments in start-ups and to keep a
low inventor’s share of royalties in the incubation
period. In the Netherlands, a sizeable proportion
(62%) of the Dutch spin-offs indicated that
attracting sufficient start-up capital forms an
important barrier (Ministry of Economic Affairs,
2003a). The value of the intellectual property at
this stage of patent life is still uncertain and
therefore relatively small (Sherry and Teece, 2004),
making it difficult to attract venture capital.
In conclusion
With regard to the role of sectoral institutions, as
the second institutional layer in Figure 1, we can
conclude as follows. In establishing IP-based spin-
offs it is more the characteristics of the sectoral
knowledge base that counts: mono-disciplinary
and codified knowledge as outcome of the search
process, in combination with more tacit knowledge
on the search process itself. With regard to the
subsequent chances of success, our findings indi-
cate the role of regional clusters that stimulates the
creation of IP-based spin-offs. Proximity of a
PRO, venture capitalists, and possibly technical
facilities and incubation parks form key-ingredi-
ents of such a cluster. This geographical proximity
is important in leveraging the potential of IP-based
spin-offs, in view of tacit knowledge exchange and
other proximity-related benefits.
6. Third layer: PRO policy with regard to spin-offs
This section discusses the third layer in our con-
ceptual model (see Figure 1 again) that concerns
PRO policy with regard to technology transfer and
spin-offs in particular. In order to structure our
insights on the role of PRO policy, we distinguish
between two types of factors. We first discuss
factors that especially shape the degree, in which
IP-based spin-offs are established, namely PRO
policy. As a next step, we discuss those factors that
entail how this PRO policy is implemented in
terms of its organizational set-up, type of support
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services and level of formalization. This
combination of factors mostly shapes their
chances of success, once established.
Establishing spin-offs: PRO Policy
The technology transfer policy of PROs influences
the possibilities to establish IP-based spin-offs.
Based on our interviews, we have observed simi-
larities among US universities in their approach of
technology transfer and the establishment of IP-
based spin-offs. From a more historical perspec-
tive, many US universities have always been more
involved in technology transfer than universities in
the Netherlands. Even before the Bayh-Dole Act,
many PROs had departments with a strong focus
on applied science that were in close interaction
with industry (Mowery et al., 2004).
Nowadays, most PROs in the US have adopted
policies for encouraging entrepreneurship and
spin-offs (Etzkowitz, 2002; Goldfarb and Hen-
drekson, 2003; Wright et al., 2004). Most research
professors are part-time involved in business con-
sulting, often as a research director, such as at
UCLA and Harvard (Nelson, 2001). Almost all
US PROs have a technology transfer office and are
actively pursuing technology transfer policy
through patenting, licensing and/or the creation of
IP-based spin-offs. This active involvement with
technology transfer increases the chance of estab-
lishment of IP-based spin-offs.
Surprisingly, many Dutch PROs do not have
some kind of policy in place to stimulate the
establishment of IP-based spin-offs. Although na-
tional policymakers are aware of the benefits to
stimulate the establishment of spin-offs (see again
Table 1 in Section 2) and most PROs do have
Technology Transfer Offices (TTOs), Wintjes et al.
(2002) recently observed that many universities do
not yet recognize the benefits neither of a tech-
nology transfer policy nor of a policy for encour-
aging (IP-based) spin-offs. This is supported by
most of our interviewees in the Netherlands.
Despite the fact, as we observed in our interviews,
that at most Dutch TTOs there is generally a
strong commitment to support spin-offs, this
stands in sharp contrast with ideas of the general
university board or faculty policies. An explana-
tion for this observation may be that universities
and PROs are not single, consistently acting
entities. Instead, they are made up of a number of
smaller entities such as an university board, one or
more technology transfer offices (TTOs), various
faculties consisting of different departments and
numerous chairs, all of which have different
responsibilities, goals and interests (Etzkowitz,
2003; Kenney and Goe, 2004). Without the pres-
sure from a federal or national framework such as
the Bayh-Dole Act it becomes difficult in these
circumstances to develop an effective technology
transfer policy. As a consequence, this lack of
general interest and the absence of a consistent
technology transfer policy definitely hinders the
establishment of IP-based spin-offs in the Nether-
lands (Table III).
Apart from the similarities in technology
transfer and spin-off policies among US-based
PROs, they also reveal important differences. The
historical context, the eminence of the PRO, its
culture, regulations in general, all influence the
interpretation and implementation of technology
transfer in practice (Feldman and Decroches,
2003; Kenney and Goe, 2004; Mowery et al.,
2004). Based on our interviews, we discuss three
aspects of technology transfer policies and how
these may differ across PROs as well as between
the US and the Netherlands: royalty sharing,
equity investments (capital needs) and the role of
incubators.
First, university policy with regard to sharing
royalty rates between the inventors and the uni-
versity are important for the establishment of IP-
based spin-offs. Clear rules for royalty sharing, as
provided by the Bahy-Dole Act (see also Section
4), are important to avoid a conflict of interests. In
addition, the literature suggests that higher pay-
sharing rates, as a percentage incentive payment
from licensing revenues given to either a scientist
or to its department, may result in a decrease of
the number of university spin-offs. Other studies
seem to confirm this, namely that a (certain) share
of royalties obtained by the inventor increases the
establishment and success of IP-based spin-offs
(Hsu and Bernstein, 1997; Matkin, 2001). To sum
up, clear university rules and a low inventor’s
share of royalties are both important conditions
for the establishment and success of IP-based
spin-offs.
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Second, PRO policy with regard to equity
investments in IP-based spin-offs plays an impor-
tant role. The willingness of the university to take
an equity stake in its spin-off affects the estab-
lishment and the success of an IP-based spin-off.
Spin-offs typically lack cash, which limits its pos-
sibilities to cover patent costs, up-front license
fees, costs of research facilities and marketing
activities. Di Gregorio and Shane (2003) confirm
that equity investments of the university in their
own spin-off are more important in early stages of
a spin-off creation than the availability of formal
venture capital. This is confirmed by our inter-
views at Yale University and the University of
California, indicating that the active pursuit of an
equity programme stimulates the establishment of
spin-offs. These findings are in contrast with policy
in the Netherlands, with its main focus on pro-
viding venture capital in order to stimulate the
creation of university spin It concerns in particular
new technological fields such as research tools, life
forms and genetic inventions in biotechnology,
software and business methods in the field of ICT -
off (see also Section 4). This type of policy negates
the notion, as advanced in the literature that the
role and the type of risk capital needed for an IP-
based spin-off changes over time (Bromley, 2004).
So called ‘business angels’, with an average net
worth of less than US$ 300,000, and universities
themselves through equity investments in their
own spin-offs, are especially important in the early
stages of development of an IP-based spin-off (Di
Gregorio and Shane, 2003). In the next phase risk
capital is necessary for further growth and typi-
cally comes from venture capitalists. In further
phases of IP-based spin-off development the role
of federal and local government research grants in
combination with R&D cooperation with other
Table III










Universities of which: 13 224 499
Technische Universiteit Delft (TUD) [2332] 90 57
Rijksuniversiteit Groningen (RUG) 1470 26 42
Rijksuniversiteit Leiden (RUL) 1610 24 12
Universiteit Utrecht (UU) 2108 19 4
Universiteit Twente (UT) 771 18 226
Technische Universiteit Eindhoven (TUE) 743 17 40
Universiteit van Amsterdam (UvA) 1708 10 19
Katholieke Universiteit Nijmegen (KUN) 1483 8 30
Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam (VU) 1269 4 –
Universiteit Maastricht (UM) 783 3 39
Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam (EUR) 847 3 20
Wageningen Universiteit (WU) 839 2 10
Katholieke Universiteit Brabant (UvT, formerly KUB) 274 0 –
Academic hospitals 8 Not available 0
Large technological institutes 5 Not available 11
Institutes of The Netherlands Organisation
for Applied Scientific Research (TNO)
20 Not available 21
Agricultural Research Service (DLO) 8 Not available 3
Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NWO) 9 Not available 11
Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences (KNAW) 21 Not available 0
Top technological institutes 4 Not available 0
Institutes for higher professional education 36 Not available 1
Totals 124 546
Data on the number of institutes and identified spin-offs is based on Senter (2001). Source of patent applications is based on AWT
(2001). Data on academic staff is based on the report ‘‘Digitaal Ontsloten Cijfers—DOC (2001)’’ by the Associations of Universities in
The Netherlands (VSNU). Data on academic staff concerning TU Delft, which is lacking in the other sources, is based on the report
‘Personeelomvang TU Delft in fte 1990–2002’ published by that university.
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(larger) firms becomes important (Bromley, 2004;
Sherry and Teece, 2004). So, governments need to
be aware of the full range of risk capital that is
needed along the path from initial establishment
towards successful growth of an IP-based spin-off.
Solely relying on sources of venture capital
does clearly not suffice for the establishment of
IP-based spin-offs.
A third element of technology transfer policy is
the availability of incubator parks for IP-based
spin-offs. Such incubator parks allow spin-offs to
develop university technology further in close
proximity of the scientist inventors. In an early
development stage of a spin-off, the scientific input
of the local inventor is very important for the
further development of the technology in view of
future commercialization (Jensen and Thursby,
2002). Apart from providing access to the univer-
sity, these incubator parks may reduce costs of
development through offering subsidies and offer
the possibility of sharing of overhead costs.
However, in the literature as well in practice, this
positive impact of university-affiliated incubators
on the establishment and success of IP-based spin-
offs is not uncontested (Phillips, 2002; Di Gregorio
and Shane, 2003; Appold, 2004; Markman et al.,
2004). In our interviews at Columbia University it
was stressed that subsidized incubator parks keep
the weak firms alive, consuming the research
facilities and potential venture capital from
successful ones.
In the Netherlands however, our interviews with
Dutch spin-offs indicated that access to such
facilities, through a proper arrangement with their
PRO was perceived as an important key success
factor. In order to prevent a potential risk of
conflict of interests, some Dutch spin-offs men-
tioned that they prefer to pay a fair price to the
institute for using its facilities such as laboratory
access, secretarial support or housing.
In contrast to the Netherlands, national legis-
lation in the US generally prohibits access to PRO
facilities by commercial firms. This may depend,
among other things, on the status of the university
(public or private). As a result, spin-offs have to
foresee in their own needs and obviously only
those with sufficient funds may be able to do that.
These observations more pertain to the life sci-
ences sector as, in general, many spin-offs in the
ICT sector do not need the kind of facilities as
described above. Generally, an office and a set of
computers is all it takes to start off (although we
recognize that in some domains of the ICT sector
costly laboratory facilities are required as well).
So, in the US we found that there is a much
‘thicker wall’ between institutes and firms. For this
reason, long-term support is more limited such as
access to facilities such as laboratories. Most uni-
versities will not allow such access, and state uni-
versities are not even allowed to do so because of
their public status.
Chances of success: implementation of PRO policy
Now that we have discussed policy strategy and its
contents, we further focus on how this policy
‘reaches’ IP-based spin-offs, being the ‘target
group’. Instrumental in this respect, and basically
affecting the chances of success, are its organiza-
tional set-up, the level and type of support, the
type of contractual arrangements and the degree of
formal distance between PRO and spin-off.
Apart from the contents of PRO policy, there
are also some relevant organizational consider-
ations. Various organizational models exist for
both technology transfer and spin-off support at
universities. Most often, both activities were per-
formed in one single office, most often referred to
as Technology Transfer Office (TTO). Whereas
most TTOs deal with all aspects of technology
transfer, we have also come across cases where
IPR activities were entirely separated from spin-off
support activities. On the other hand, some uni-
versities have outsourced all technology transfer
activities to a specialized third party. An example
is ARTI of Indiana University. This type of
organizational set-up increases the flexibility of the
technology transfer activities for instance to apply
(university) funds for certain spin-offs activities
(Matkin, 2001).
In the Netherlands, most Dutch universities
have the TTO office in-house. Compared to the
United States, Dutch TTOs are generally small
and often employ no more than 1 or 2 fte’s. As a
consequence, people have to be generalists rather
than specialists and consequently they have to rely
on external expertise as well. In contrast, TTOs at
the large US universities that we visited often
employ as many as 10–25 fte’s. In the US, most
TTO staff used to be administrators with a
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generalist background like in the Netherlands to-
day. However, we were informed that many TTOs
are turning into professional specialized teams
with top experts on patent application, licensing
negotiations, successful business people and spin-
off entrepreneurs. An example is the TTO of
UCLA.
Another observation is that that many TTOs in
the United States function more and more as pro-
fessional learning organizations with professional
teams of highlymotivated people. In contrast, in the
Netherlands the rather inflexible nature of univer-
sity policy tends to inhibit such professionalisation
trends of TTOs. For instance, the lack of flexibility
of salaries of TTO personnel, which is often part of
general university policy, can limit possibilities to
attract star business people or legal personnel. This
ongoing professionalizing of TTOs in the US will
positively enhance chances of success if IP-based
spin-offs (OECD, 2003). The communication and
marketing activities of TTO personnel are impor-
tant for the creation of university spin-offs (Mark-
man et al., 2004). It involves in particular TTO
activities with regard to inventions at an embryonic
stage of development, which are often further
developed in IP-based spin-offs.
The downside of expanding the commerciali-
zation of transfer technology offices is that
some are behaving too aggressively. Our inter-
views confirmed the observation of Nelson (2001,
p. 17) that some firms in the US are becoming
increasingly dissatisfied with the way universities
are claiming and trying to profit from intellectual
property. In the literature, and confirmed by our
interviews, Columbia University is mentioned
several times as an exemplary case.
The level and type of support for IP-based spin-
offs differs across PROs, both in the US and the
Netherlands. Depending on the presence of strong
regional clusters, such support may not be needed
at all. In the case of Silicon Valley, home to
institutes such as Caltech, Stanford and Berkeley,
there is strong interaction among PRO staff,
businesses, capital providers and entrepreneurs. In
such a setting, spin-offs have a fair chance to make
it on their own. Support for them may come from
private parties such as specialized venture capital
providers or ‘business angels’. This diminishes the
need for specific support by the PRO, which then
often only acts as a licensing agent.
However, in most areas such a regional cluster
is less developed, or even absent. In this respect all
interviewees agreed that in such a case, an actively
supporting role by a PRO will certainly have a
positive effect on the success changes of spin-offs,
by offering support and facilities to overcome such
lack of resources. Types of support that were
mentioned during the interviews were: secretarial
and other facilitative support, options for housing,
access to facilities such as laboratories, libraries
and support with finding additional sources of
funding and facilities (Matkin, 2001).
The contractual (IP) agreements between PRO
and spin-off differ widely. Some PROs transfer the
ownership of the IP rights the spin-off. In return,
the institute receives a lump sum or, more com-
monly, a part of the shares (‘equity’) of the new
firm. The advantage for the PRO is that all costs
are taken away, including the burden for obtaining
and retaining an IPR. Other PROs decide to retain
IP ownership and provide a license to the spin-off
instead, either on an exclusive or non-exclusive
basis. For PROs this brings the advantage that IP
rights are not lost, in the case of unforeseen
bankruptcy by the spin-off. On the other hand, the
consequences in case of a possible liability claim
can be tremendous. Often the PROs are not
capable to deal financially and legally with large IP
law cases.
Another issue here is the level of ‘formal dis-
tance’ between PROs and spin-offs. In line with its
informal culture, in the Netherlands this distance
is rather short. It is considered common practice
for the inventor to be highly involved in the new
firm, often through a senior management position
and sometimes even as CEO. Instead, in the US,
the PRO usually prefers that the inventor makes a
choice either for the PRO or for the firm, and not
for a combination in order to prevent conflict of
interest. It is rather unusual for the inventor/fac-
ulty member to join the spin-off. Usually this new
IP-based is runned by experienced entrepreneurs
that are attracted either by the inventor(s), the
TTO or a venture capitalist. Most often, the fac-
ulty member takes a position as chairman of the
Scientific Board of the spin-off, and any possible
conflict of interest is well managed. We will further
elaborate on this in Section 7. As discussed earlier
in Section 4, the US Bayh-Dole Act requires from
PROs to offer a compensation scheme for
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inventors, and many of such schemes include ra-
ther generous payments to these faculty members.
In fact, at one university we talked to, the inven-
tor(s) receive 50% of the net income up to
US$100,000, 40% between US$ 100,000 and
200,000 and 30% of all turnover above US$
200,000. By doing an unusually valuable invention
(a ‘golden egg’), some faculty members became
multimillionaires.
In conclusion
With regard to the role of PRO policy, as the third
institutional layer in Figure 1, we can conclude as
follows. In contrast to the Netherlands, most PROs
in the US have clear technology transfer policies in
place and actively pursue patenting and licensing
activities, aimed at establishing IP-based spin-offs.
Relevant elements of such policy are formed by
clear agreements on royalty sharing, the possibility
to make equity investments in IP-based spin-offs
and the role of incubators. Implementation of this
PRO policy through specialized TTO services, clear
contractual agreements on IP-protection and the
type of staff involvement mostly affect chances of
success. The relative absence of such PRO policy in
the Netherlands may form one of the key reasons
for its comparatively poor performance in estab-
lishing IP-based spin-offs and their success chances.
7. Fourth layer: management of the spin-off
In this section we discuss the fourth and final layer
of our model (see Figure 1 again), which entails
the management of the spin-off. We argue that
factors at this micro-level especially affect the
survival rate and growth opportunities for spin-
offs. In other words, this layer deals more with
success chances, not so much with establishing a
spin-off in he first place. To deal with these man-
agerial issues, we will focus on two aspects: the
underlying business model and the presence of
entrepreneurial skills and managerial experience.
Chances of success: the underlying business model
of the spin-off
Many Dutch spin-offs employ a so-called ‘tools’ or
‘service’ business model. For example, the majority
of start-ups in the Dutch life science sector,
approximately 65–70%, are based on such a busi-
ness model. This model entails the sale of technol-
ogy and/research results as well as the provision of
services such as consultancy, often in the form of
contract research. Although these models have the
benefit that they generate income potentially from
day one, margins and profits are relatively low and
competition is strong(er). This is in contrast to the
product-based model, which entails more of a
stand-alone strategy by developing a ‘blockbuster’
product with potentially very high margins but also
with considerable costs and risks. Although the
combination of IPRs, strong R&D expertise and
secrecy may create first-mover advantages, it gen-
erally takes years before the first money is earned, if
at all. Therefore, a more viable alternative is
emerging that consists of a hybrid model, using
elements of both. The general idea is to first develop
a strong position around a sophisticated technology
platform that can generate cash-flow through
licensing fees. These initial revenue streams may
then open up possibilities to develop a unique
product later on. This model lowers one-sided
dependency on larger firms and may create a pos-
sibility to cooperate with other start-up firms as
well, positively enhancing chances of success.
Chances of success: entrepreneurial skills
and management experience
In the Netherlands it is considered common
practice of a scientific inventor to leave the PRO in
order to become employed by the new firm or to
become CEO of the new firm. Our empirical
findings indicate that there two potential draw-
backs with such a transfer: (1) the inventor does
not necessarily have the right qualities and expe-
rience for such a crucial position as CEO, and, (2)
the PRO loses a valuable staff member.
In contrast, US spin-offs tend to be run by
professional managers instead of former faculty
staff. An example is formed by Yale University
that has decided to only attract external managers
for all its IP-based spin-offs. Also the spin-off
Nantero is an example of such an American spin-
off where experienced managers are attracted
(both cases are described in more detail in the
Appendix).
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Based on our interviews we have found two
conditions of importance here: (1) the new man-
agement needs to be qualified to lead the new firm,
and, (2) the risk of conflict of interests should be
minimized. This underlines the importance of
attracting professional managers from outside.
This pre-empts scientists with potentially ques-
tionable managerial qualities, to become directly
involved and prevents a conflict of interest as he
remains at the PRO. This may also explain why
most of our US interviewees indicated that IP-
based spin-offs without direct staff involvement are
seen to have most promising prospects, as men-
tioned in Section 2. This is also in line with recent
EU-findings on remuneration (European Com-
mission, 2002). According to this study, most
CEOs of US spin-offs receive a share in the firm but
no initial salary, and thus have a strong incentive to
make the firm successful. Moreover, US-based
spin-offs also tend to be larger in personnel and
capital. According to our interviewees, the idea is
that this positively influences the presence of the
right mix of skills at various levels in the firm.
In conclusion
With regard to the role of spin-off management, as
the fourth institutional layer in Figure 1, we can
conclude as follows. Chances of success on the
short term seem to benefit most from a service
model, whereas on the longer term success chances
benefit more from a product-based model. As ar-
gued, a hybrid model may be considered as com-
bining best of both worlds. Furthermore, informed
by US-experiences, IP-based spin-offs should
consider attracting external professionals as CEO
and managers instead of the original scientific
inventor.
8. Conclusion
The aim of this paper is to identify which institu-
tional factors determine the possibilities to estab-
lish an IP-based spin-off, and once established
which institutional factors determine their success
chances. To answer this question, we have made
use of a conceptual framework that differentiates
among four different institutional layers. An
indicative comparison between the Netherlands
and the United States, as the benchmark in the
field of technology transfer, has enabled us to
better understand these institutional factors
according to their role and relevance. Our empir-
ical findings indicate that all four institutional
layers need to be taken into consideration and that
these layers differ in their role and level of impact.
The higher institutional layers, notably national
and sectoral institutions, particularly condition
whether such spin-offs are established in the first
place. The lower institutional layers, notably PRO
policy and spin-off management, more influence
their subsequent chances of success. See also
Figure 2.
Following the logic of this framework, to in-
crease the number of newly established IP-based
spin-offs in the Netherlands is, first of all, a con-
cern for national policy (layer 1). In this respect,
national legislation and/or European guidelines
may be required to create the necessary incentives
for PROs to be actively engaged in technology
transfer, including the creation of IP-based spin-
offs. Moreover, sectoral characteristics play an
important role whether IP-based spin-off are the
most effective mechanism for technology transfer
or that alternative mechanisms are more preferable
(layer 2). Next PRO policy becomes relevant in
enhancing the establishment of IP-based spin-offs
(layer 3), especially in terms of royalty sharing,
equity investments, capital needs and contractual
agreements on IP-protection. Once established, it
is first of all the management of such a firm that
should be ‘sufficiently capable’ (layer 4). A viable
business model, external professionals and no
conflict of interest are key issues in this respect.
When these conditions are met sufficiently, it be-
comes sensible to support such a spin-off from the
side of a PRO through a variety of means such as
the availability of venture capital, housing, access
to technical facilities, libraries and so on (layer 3).
National law and policy 
Sectoral characteristics
PRO policy 
Management of the spin-off 
Conditions that affect the 
establishment of spin-offs
Conditions that affect the 
success chances of spin-offs
Figure 2. The four institutional layers and their effect on
establishing and chances of success of IP-based spin-offs.
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And only then cluster-based cooperation with
other firms can develop (layer 2), which is critical
in two ways. It enhances not only the chances of
success of the spin-off firm, but also
enables knowledge diffusion from PROs to
industry, which again connects with one of the key
national policy aims to stimulate technology
transfer (layer 1).
In this way, the role and effect of institutional
layers can be seen as systemic, in terms of a
‘hierarchy of effects’. As far as increasing the
number of newly established IP-based spin-offs is
concerned, this hierarchy is top-down, starting at
the national level (layer 1) and entailing sectoral
characteristics (layer 2) and the role of PRO policy
(layer 3). As far as chances of success are con-
cerned, this hierarchy of effects is bottom-up,
starting at the managerial level (layer 4) and
entailing the role of PRO policy (layer 3) and
sectoral characterics, most notably the role of
regional clusters (layer 2).
We propose that the systemic relations among
these layers could form a guiding principle for
rearranging policy in the Netherlands, and poten-
tially elsewhere as well, aimed at increasing the
effectiveness of IP-based spin-offs as a mechanism
for technology transfer. The framework enables to
systematically address the right issues in the right
order when priority is attached either to increasing
the number of spin-offs, to increase their chances of
success, or to both at the same time.
Our comparison with the US has provided us
with insights in the difference between both
countries. Indicated by our figures and confirmed
by our interviews, it is fair to say that the US is
way ahead in effectively making use of IP-based
spin-offs for technology transfer. Our framework
has enabled us to relate this difference in perfor-
mance to differences between both countries in
terms of the four institutional layers. In this re-
spect, there is one key difference in particular, at
layer 1, that may importantly explain the lagging
performance of the Netherlands. Without the
‘selective pressure’ exerted by a common national
framework such as the Bayh-Dole Act in the US, it
becomes very difficult to develop a consistent
policy for technology transfer and IP-based spin-
offs in particular. Some of the differences that we
have identified at the lower institutional layers
may be seen as a logical consequence of this. At
layer 3 this entails, among others, the risk of a
conflict of interests among the various involved
bodies at a PRO in the Netherlands, such as its
among its TTO, university board, faculty direc-
tors, individual chairs and so on. Other issues at
layer 3 that need to be addressed are unclear rules
for royalty sharing, the possibility of equity
investments, clearer agreements on IPs and the
limited degree of professionalizing of TTOs. At
layer 4 this entails more attention for the right
business model, attracting external managers with
professional managerial skills and no or only very
limited direct involvement from former scientific
staff.
Informed by our comparison with the US, such
adjustments to the national framework (layer 1)
may consist of mandatory disclosure and reporting
as well as general rules for royalty sharing.
Moreover, the introduction of a European Grace
Period may also form a good incentive to increase
the number of IP-based spin-offs. However, we
need to add here that legal incentives and institu-
tional adaptations are not enough. A profound
change in the mindset of Dutch researchers, its
venture capitalists, its policymakers and the man-
agers of its spin-offs is needed at least as much.
Only then we may expect the much sought after
growth of the number of IP-based spin-offs and an
increase of their success chances, in view of an
effective transfer or publicly developed technology
to industry.
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Notes
1. Public Research Organizations (PROs) include universities
as well as other (public) research organizations that receive
significant public research funds. This definition is based on the
OECD (2003). Another, similar term is Public Sector Research
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Establishments (PSREs). In the remainder of this article we will
use the term Public Research Organizations that we abbreviate
as PRO.
2. Similar trends have been observed in other countries, and
have been analysed various national contexts. Nelson (2001),
for instance, discusses studied the US situation in which the
number of patents granted to universities has increased more
than eightfold between 1979 and 2000.
3. The perception on patent ownership differs profoundly
between the United States and the Netherlands. In the US
intellectual property system, the entity that can prove that it
was the first to develop the invention owns the patent. This is
called the ‘First-to-Invent’ system. In the European so-called
‘First-to-File’ system, it is the entity that first notifies the
invention that is granted the patent. Moreover, the establish-
ment of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (1982) and
its (recent) court decisions clearly strengthened the position of
patent owners further. See also Jaffe (2000) and Kortum and
Lerner (1999).
4. The university has an obligation to disclose each new
invention to the federal funding agency within two months after
the inventor discloses it in writing to the university (OECD,
2003). The university must submit periodic reports regarding the
utilization of the invention as requested by the funding agency.
5. Several existing programs do offer such early-phase support
in Life Sciences such as Biopartner and Genomics. Another
example of a university specific program to stimulate the cre-
ation of spin-offs is TopSpin programme of the University of
Twente.
Appendix: Selected illustrative case studies
Yale University (New Haven, CT) has a very active
TTO that is committed to have successful spin-offs
established on the basis of its technology. Its main
drivers are a contribution to the local economic
development and the creation of a successful bio-
tech cluster in the New Haven area. Yale employs
an advanced process that ranges from discovery,
disclosure, and opportunity analysis to commer-
cialisation. This process includes various feedback
loops as well as includes decision points such as
whether to protect the invention or not, and how
to commercialize it (licensing to large or small
existing firms vis-à-vis the establishment of a spin-
off). Main considerations to opt for spin-offs are
(1) the chances for success of the technology in
question, (2) the degree to which the Yale TTO
expertise is necessary, and (3) value creation.
In the Yale model, there are four actors that
provide the main inputs for the prospective spin-
off: the inventor, the scientists (non-inventors), the
university, and the CEO. In return for its input,
each will receive 25% equity in the firm (that is,
before the first round of investments).
The inventors’ input and that of the scientific
team is evident: the invention and its further
development are a substantial contribution to the
firm. The role of the inventor(s) often includes a
position on the scientific board of the start-up
firm, among other things. The university’s input
consists of developing the initial business strategy,
applying for and maintaining the intellectual
property, recruiting the management and key
(science) advisors, and raising money from quali-
fied investors. As a matter of policy, however, the
university is not prepared to waive license fees for
equity. The CEO, finally, is attracted by the uni-
versity. His or her role is to further develop busi-
ness strategy and business plans, recruit additional
management, manage the start-up and company
formation, negotiate license agreements with the
university, and negotiate financing with investors.
A typical CEO has a successful start-up track
record, is acceptable to investors, understands,
accepts & manages risk, understands science, has
realistic expectations and has an entrepreneurial
attitude. Although this person initially works at
own risk (no salaries paid), the received equity
could potentially be very valuable on the longer
run. This increases the motivation.
As a result of their pro-active patenting and
spin-off activities, Yale has half a dozen to a dozen
new spin-offs each year. At this moment, four Yale
spin-offs have raised well above US$ 10 million of
public money. Furthermore, Yale-founded spin-
offs account for more than 10% of all biotech
investments in New England.
LioniX is a spin-off of the Twente University
(The Netherlands). It was founded in January
2001. A year and a half, later it employed 14
persons. LioniX develops and produces integrated
optics, innovative components and subsystems for
applications in telecommunications, industrial
process control and in the life sciences sector. Its
appealing products include a lab-on-a-chip for
water analysis and an optical chip used for bio-
chemical experiments. Technology developed at
the university is a substantial contribution to the
creation and operations of this firm. The interest-
ing element is that in this case university knowl-
edge is not protected by patents. Instead, there is
an agreement that LioniX has exclusive, early
access to university research and inventions.
Although these findings are published later
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through the regular channels, the spin-off has a
very valuable lead time and can develop products
while the competition still has to start to feed their
research with the published findings. Apart from
this agreement with the TTO, LioniX itself is
rapidly building a firm IPR position in its fields.
This spin-off owns several research facilities,
and in addition has an agreement that provides
access to university-owned facilities. Such access is
essential, as the investments for a facility such as a
clean room exceeds 20 million Euros. This is an
unsurpassable threshold for a start-up company.
The access to university facilities is based on a
market-based compensation. The biggest challenge
LioniX experienced during its establishment phase
was to get the necessary funding. Venture capi-
talists require a solid growth plan plus an experi-
enced management team. With the entirely
different culture at PROs, a culture clash is inevi-
table.
The founders of LioniX believe that there are
several ways in which the government could
stimulate and support the establishment of spin-
offs. Peripheral events such as the administrative
burden and housing consume much time and en-
ergy that could be better spend on core activities.
Support for such activities would be very welcome
as part of a university or government programme.
Essential, however, is that such support is granted
only after the spin-off succeeded in funding its
activities. Earlier support interferes with market
selection mechanisms, making it undesirable. Also,
it is important that within such a program the
spin-off must be free to choose where to purchase
such support services, as PROs or other institu-
tions are not necessarily the most experienced
suppliers.
Nantero is a Boston-based spin-off that was
established in 2001and that develops a non-volatile
computer memory technology on the basis of a
nanotechnology invention at Harvard University.
The intended memory chips work on the basis of
single-wall carbon nanotubes, which have a wall
thickness of 1 atom and a diameter of 0.4–3 nm.
The chips are non-volatile, very fast, and have a
high density. It may thus replace several types of
existing memory technologies such as Flash (often
found in portable devices such as digital cameras,
PDAs, and mobile phones), DRAM (the main
memory of personal computers and laptops) and
SRAM (high-speed memory, used in routers,
switches and also for certain purposes in personal
computers). Interesting possible uses include the
enabling of instant-on computers
The founders of the spin-off, two actual Har-
vard inventors and an experienced entrepreneur
that previously established several start-ups, set up
the firm without specific support from Harvard.
Although there are many, valuable informal con-
tacts with Harvard (as well as with MIT, in fact),
their only formal link is a license agreement.
It is the conviction of Nantero that this new
technology would not be adopted by existing
market players if they would have been offered a
license. Main reasons are that (1) they have al-
ready invested in existing technologies, and opt
more for incremental improvements, (2) the
motivation of all involved to make such a novel
technology successful might not be as extreme as
that of spin-off employees, whose driver is the high
reward in case of success, and (3) they lack the
necessary skills (nanotechnology is a rather dif-
ferent field from that of traditional chip engineers).
Also, existing firms might take out a license only
for defensive reasons.
The business model of this spin-off is a product-
based one, not a service model. Nevertheless, it is
well imaginable that final production will be out-
sourced (despite its novelty, the memory chips may
be produced with conventional production tech-
niques) or that Nantero will sub-license its product
to existing memory producers. Although existing
firms tend to opt more for incremental improve-
ments in-house, as discussed above, they are
sometimes willing to partner with start-up firms
that are pursuing radical improvements. The ideal
for the firm would be an IPO, but given the current
market situation this is not the right moment.
Selling the firm in a later stage is also an option.
Advanced Lightweight Engineering (ALE) is a
spin-off of the Delft University of Technology.
While studying aerospace engineering, ALEs
founder Jan-Jaap Koppert and his professor had
been working on specific materials that offer a
unique combination of strength and weight. While
a patent application was being prepared, it was
recognized that possible applications could be
much broader than those in the aeronautical sector
alone. In particular, it could be used for fuel vessels
in cars that run on liquid petrol gas. ALE was
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founded in 1996 and now employs 11 people. One
of its strengths is its ability to translate its
innovative lightweight technologies for use in other
sectors. Apart from fuel vessels for cars, ALE is
involved in gas bottles for the home appliances
market (for cooking and heating, as used by 60%
of all people worldwide) and structural parts of
marine vessels. It also produced a number of
satellite antennas for the European Space Agency
(ESA). Apart from product design, ALE offers
services in the field of testing and research for
multinationals like Airbus and Akzo Nobel.
A substantial contribution to the start-up of this
firm was a patent application that was transferred
from the university to the spin-off. About the early
relation with the university, ALEs founder recalls:
‘One problem is that the TTO is wearing two hats.
On one hand, it aims to facilitate a successful start-
up, on the other it has an interest in maximising the
gains from its intellectual property.Althoughwedid
not experience real problems ourselves, such a
conflict of interest couldhamper goodnegotiations’.
According to its founder, the real value of spin-
offs such as ALE lies in the available tacit
knowledge, and the motivation and enthusiasm of
people involved. ALEs relation with the university
is one in which cross fertilisation prevails, both in
the field of knowledge and market developments.
Furthermore, the relation with the university offers
ALE a valuable recruitment ground, while the
university is able to offer opportunities to its stu-
dents. In ALEs field, access to research facilities
(laboratories) is crucially important, as well as
access to people and knowledge. In that respect,
improvements can be made. However, support by
universities for spin-offs should be essentially
limited to providing facilities: ‘In the case of ALE,
the search for capital went relatively smooth. Any-
way, in my sector, nobody believes in financial
subsidies by universities. If a prospective entrepre-
neur is not able to raise capital by himself, there is
something essentially wrong. One should not
subsidise such cases’.
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